Letters

COMPLEXITY AND CONSERVATION: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In his broadly, and at times commendably, pugnacious essay,"Human Natures, Nature Conservation, and Environmental Ethics," Paul Ehrlich (2002) claims that ecologists have failed to respond to the ongoing destruction of Earth's natural systems. Ehrlich holds that ecologists often use a "nonscientific 'shotgun' approach to nature, and for their folly have paid a high price in lack of progress (and of prestige within the scientific community)" (p. 34). Ehrlich further claims that "humanity is suffering because of the resultant paucity of scientific information" (p. 34). Ehrlich's remedy for this lapse would be for ecologists to work on a few "carefully chosen sample systems-the biodiversity equivalents of Escherichia, Arabidopsis, Caenorhabditis, Drosophila, and Mus" (p. 33) . He explains that by focusing their energies on such sample systems, ecologists might offer, belatedly, insights into the fundamental questions concerning biodiversity that link the field of ecology to solutions for the conservation crisis.
We will not argue here with ecology's alleged low standing within the scientific community. However, the claim of unscientific folly and the recommendation that ecologists focus their research on sample systems not only ignores the accomplishments that the field of ecology has achieved, it recommends the opposite strategy from that which ecologists should employ, both as scientists and conservationists. Ecologists, other scientists, politicians, and the public at large must allow the field of ecology to explore natural systems on nature's terms by understanding the limits of our ability to predict specific outcomes. When Ehrlich expects ecology to produce the blueprint that explains specific community-level patterns, he has fallen into a decidedly unscientific rhetorical trap that many anticonservationists would have us accept. Namely, that if an ecological event cannot be predicted specifically, we are left with no understanding of the system or appropriate response to the observations we make. Again, we believe the opposite is true; ignoring the inherent lack of predictability at the community and ecosystem level can produce nothing but occasional success amid frequent disappointing and politically damaging premonitions. Nature does not simplify itself for policy decisions, a fact that ecologists have learned to incorporate into their understanding of the natural world.
Ecologists have come to appreciate over the past decades that systems of organisms, whether in the context of their geological and chemical environments (ecosystems) or as collections of directly and indirectly interacting populations (communities), rarely show deterministic behavior (Ulanowicz 1997). Ecological systems rarely display equilibrium behavior (Drake 1991). Further, many qualities of ecosystems and communities emerge from interactions at scales below and above the focal scale (Levin 1992). All of these features of ecology make long-term or precise prediction futile (as is the case with meteorology). The resulting state of ecology is not failed science, but a science for which precise prediction is neither possible nor fundamental to its progress (Huisman and Weissing 2001). We often want science to decompose complex patterns, to predict outcomes. Checking this hope will allow more realistic and rewarding explanations of our natural world, explanations that integrate scales, phenomena, and theories.
Telos, from the Greek word for "end," refers to the ultimate purpose of an object or endeavor. A great feat of biology of the last century was the discovery and study of the telos of the organism or, more accurately, the telos of an organism's genetic material. This "goal" appears at core to be reducible to the continuance, by many means, of patterns of DNA. Complexities in this function abound. Regardless, biologists have found that this genetic telos explains a great deal about an organism's morphology, behavior, and life history. Working collectively on several species (such as Arabidopsis and Drosophila) has allowed biologists to tease out the complexities and contradictions between the genetic aim of an organism and its manifestation in phenotype. Knowledge about the genetic operations in one species is transferable, at least in part, to those of other, seemingly radically different, species.
There is no clear telos for a collection of organisms, for a community, or for the ecosystem. Just as one may assign a mass of hot air the tendency of rising, how it rises and with what consequences in the context of other masses of air with differing pressures, temperatures, and so on are matters beyond the scope of simple predictions. So it is with organisms. Just because organisms individually strive to survive and reproduce cannot account for the behaviors of populations of those organisms, especially when exposed to other species in a natural community. Because we cannot extrapolate community-level patterns from individual determination, processes identified in one community may not readily apply to another. We cannot, therefore, expect sample systems to produce the same broadly applicable understanding of communities that we can about genomes.
That said, ecologists do work on sample systems. Long-term ecological research sites have operated for decades. Further focusing on these sites, however, or even expanding them at the expense of other locations, would not address the frustration Ehrlich feels about ecological approaches to conservation. We recommend that ecologists continue to work (in partnership and alone) on a variety of systems (common and rare) and in varying degrees of disturbance. We cannot anticipate the system, the organism, or the theoretical model that will produce great insight into species interactions, abundance relationships, or the impact of a species' extinction on ecosystem function. More important than where we work is how we work. Ecologists cannot embrace one paradigm at the expense of others. Rather, ecologists should keep (and help other scientists keep) their minds open to multiple models and hypotheses, contradictory bodies of evidence, and ingenious biological and mathematical explanations for the systems we study.
We agree with Ehrlich that the preservation of the earth's biota cannot be successful without understanding the system of biological life. A dynamic systems approach, where patterns are not the sum of their parts, appreciates biological life as it has presented itself to us, not as we would have it. To pool the energies of ecologists into a handful of designated systems whose patterning we assume adequate to reflect the whole would be to run the risk of elevating limited understandings of particular (and often politically favored) systems to the status of archetype. Ehrlich, warning against this obstinacy when criticizing genetic explanations of behavior, states that "the unitary, unchanging behavioral 'human nature,' once thought invented by gods... is nonexistent" (Ehrlich 2002, p. 32) . Ecologists have developed that same skepticism about approaching communities as teleological and absolute. Understanding the limits of predictable approaches to nature will prove essential to the proper development and implementation of a conservation strategy worthy of the magnitude of the crisis at hand and the complexity of natural systems.
